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Abstract - In an economy  with N individuals  each individual is concerned, by assumption, with 
his own felicity as well as that of all or some others. If the society is composed of very few 
individuals with a high level of wealth and many with a low one and if altruistic behaviour of any 
two individuals toward each other decreases with their wealth difference, the largest contribution to 
the felicity of other individuals is made by those whose wealth is neither too high nor too low 
(middleclass). 
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 1.  Protecting the environment, conserving natural resources, eliciting donations to charity, 
slowing arms races and promoting other aspects of the general good that demand collective effort 
and cooperation have been investigated by sociologist, economists and political scientists . 
 
     Economists  have  explored  reciprocal  altruism, a particular form of cooperative behaviour, 
constructing a variety of experiments to understand why individuals often cooperate with others to 
whom  they are unrelated. It has been founded out that people reward those who act in a co-
operative manner and punish those who do not, even if such behaviour costs them something 
personally, and even though there are no foreseeable future rewards from so behaving.  
  
     The results obtained in some of these experiments suggest that people sometimes value fairness 
over personal gains. The logic behind it is that, if people want to maximize their utility -as standard 
economics assumes- a recipient will accept any offer made by a donor while, conversely, the donor 
will always offer as little as possible. Acceptance and rejections appear to be strongly linked  - in 
addition to material benefits - to feelings of fairness and reciprocity.  
      
      Moreover it has been found out that small groups of people are more likely to cooperate than 
larger ones and that cooperative attitudes increase in repeated iterations of a situation and when the 
participant. are allowed to communicate. Overall cooperation cannot however persist in groups that 
exceeded a critical size, the size depending on how long individuals expect to remain part of the 
group and on the amount of information available to them. 
 
      Gintis [1] has suggested that if policymakers want to achieve certain public goods, such as the 
sharing of common resources, it might be appropriate to provide opportunities for the public-
spirited to punish the free riders in society. Punishment has the effect to substantially increase the 
amount that is invested in the public good. Altruism in other words emerges when people, to 
enforce a kind of  “fairness”, are willing to pay to punish someone with whom they would not 
interact again even when there are no foreseeable rewards or benefits. 
 
      There is no doubt that individuals will be better off if each and all of them adopt mutual aid 
behaviour. But such behaviour depends on the existence and the strength of the social norms in 
force in the societies where they live: if strong, the tendency to help others will be high while will 
decrease if and when weak. Social norms encourage altruism and contribute to the creation of an 
environment where altruistic behaviour can prosper.  
 
      A pure altruistic society presupposes perfect information among its members. Since anyone who 
cheats is certainly caught and punished, no rational individual will try to break the social norms 
governing that society. Imperfect information encourages cheating behaviour (an act of cheating 
may not be discovered by all other  individuals) but is conducive to a stricter enforcement of social 
and legal norms. 
 
 
2. In this kind of framework and as a first approach to the problem, I investigate a model of 
altruistic behaviour where the degree of altruism decreases with increasing social distance 
measured by the difference in wealth between two individuals. Assuming an “appropriate” 
distribution of wealth it is proved that the largest contribution to the felicity of some members of 
society is made by middleclass individuals. 
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  Let us indicate with 
 
(1)   Fi (x1,…,xm)  
 
the felicity the i.th (i ∈ N) individual has from the consumption of goods (x1,…,xm). In a purely 
individualistic society the i.th individual will maximize  (1)  so that the quantities  xj (j=1,…,m) are 
determined by the  m  equations 
 
(2)   dF / dxj = 0                    (j = 1,…,m) 
 
Furthermore, second order conditions require for a maximum that the k.th  degree form 
 





















must be negative definite. 
 
      Let us consider two individuals whose felicity will influence and be influenced by the felicity of 
the other. The felicity functions of the two individuals can be written as 
 
(4)   Fj (x11,… x1m ; x21,… x2m)          (i = 1,2) 
 
       As  the  individual  behaviour  is, in general, different the felicity function F1(⋅) of the first 
individual will be different from that of the second  F2(⋅). 
      If the individual is egoistic (selfish) his behaviour is such that he will be concerned only with 
his felicity ignoring how his choice of the xj affect the other individual felicity. He will then try to 
maximize his own F and hence we have 
 
(5)   ∂ Fi /∂  xij = 0            (i = 1,2 ; j = 1,…,m) 
 
together with the inequalities given by (3). 
 
      If an individual is concerned with the felicity of the other (altruistic behaviour) he will try to 
make  F1 + F2  as large as possible i.e. 
 
(6)   ∂ (F1+ F2)/∂ xij = 0        (i = 1,2 ; j = 1,…,m) 
 
together with the inequalities given by (3). 
 
       Consider now an economy with N  individuals, where we assume that N is very large. Let 
 
(7)   N (w) dw   
 
be the number of individuals whose endowment (wealth) lies between the values w and w+dw  
where we chose w so that it belong to the interval   [0,1], i.e. the lowest value in the economy is 
zero, while the highest is one. Then we have 
 
  2(8)
      () ∫ =
1
0
N dw w N
 
    We assume that in our economy the  i.th  individual will be concerned both with his own felicity 
and with that of all or some others. We can assume that he acts so as to 
 
(9)   max ri1 F1(x) + ri2 F2(x) + … + riN FN(x) 
 
a linear combination of the felicity of all the individuals. 
 
In (9) some rij may be zero and some may be even negative. The i.th individual is defined as an 
egoist  (selfish) if  rii > 0  but  rij = 0. In this case he is only concerned with his felicity  Fi. For the 
altruistic behaviour, all  rij  > 0  except  rii = 0. 
 
    If we arrange the quantities rij we obtain a square matrix  R 
 
 
















which tells us how people behave in our economy. This social matrix describes the existing level of 
altruism in a social system. Hence, if all elements in  R  except the diagonal (which may be chosen 
as equal to 1) are  0, the society is composed of egoistic individuals since each member considers 
only his own felicity. Thus a society of selfish individuals is characterized by 
 
(11)
   




0 ...... 0 1
 
 
         On the other hand an economy of altruists (at the maximum) is characterized by 
 
 
  3(12)   








      If the entries of  R  are all equal, the society is egalitarian. A society composed of altruistic 
individuals who will be concerned equally with their own felicity and with that of the others (i.e. if 
they try to make the sum of felicities  F1 + F2 + … + FN   as large as possible) is characterized by 
 
 
(13)   








3. Let us consider the following felicity function  (inverted parabola) 
 
(14)












where a and d are two coefficients and  cji represent a fraction of the j.th individual consumption 
enjoyed by the i.th individual. 
 
     Putting  rii = 1  the  i.th  individual will try to maximize 
 
(15)   Fi
* = ri1F1 + ri2F2 +…Fi +…rijFj +…riN FN
 
    The N equations given below will determine the values of  xi
 
(16)   ∂ Fi
*/∂ xi = 0                              (i = 1,…,N) 
 
       Introducing (14) into (15) and the latter into (16) we obtain 
 




(18)   xi = (ai /2di )+(ri1 a1 c1 +…+ riN  aN  cN i) / 2di
 
      Assuming (7) and (8) the coefficients ai and di become now functions of  w, a(w)  and  d(w). 
The coefficient rij represents the degree of altruism of the i.th  individual for the j.th one. In the 
continuous case, however, rij represents the degree of altruism of an individual of endowment  w 
with respect to another with endowment  z. Thus rij becomes a function  r(w,z)  of those two 
variables. Similarly, the cji become functions of those two variables :  c(z,N) 
 
     Integrating (16) with respect to  z , we have 
 
(19)  () ()
() ()()( )( ) ( ) w d dz w z c z w r z a z N
w d
w a










+ = ∫  
 
       We shall assume that there are very few individuals with a large wealth and many with a small 
one i.e. 
 
(20)   N(w) = L e
-sw
 
where  L  and   s  are two constants. 
 
       The coefficient L is determined from condition (8). Since 
 
(21)   
  () ()
s sw e s L dw e L




condition (8) requires that 
 
(22)    ( )
s e sN L
− − = 1 /  
 
Hence we have 
 





4. Sorokin [4] suggested that an individual concern on another decreases with increasing social 
distance, in our case measured by wealth difference. Mathematically it is convenient to choose  r(w, 
z) as  
 
(24)   r(w, z) = e
-h|w-z|
where  h  is a coefficient. 
 
     Let us now indicate with three constants 
  5 
(25)   a(w) = a ;      d(w) = d ;     c(z,w) = c. 
 
      Equation (19) now becomes 
 
(26)
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    Because of the absolute value  |w-z|  in  (24) we see that 
 
(27)   r(w, z) = e 
-s|w-z|   for     w > z 
 
(28)   r(w, z) = e 
s|w-z|   for     w < z 
 
 
Therefore, integral in (26) may be written 
 
(29)
     
() ()
() () ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
+ − − − −
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    Introducing the resulting integrals into (26), we find 
 
(30)
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For  w=0   the expression in brackets is 
 
(31)   (1/(s+h)) (1-e 
-(s-h)) > 0 
 
For  w=1  it is equal to 
 




     If  s > h, then both 1/(s-h) > 0  and the difference of the exponential is also positive. If    s < h, 
then both 1/(s-h) and the difference of the exponentials are negative. Hence in both cases the 
expression in brackets of (30) is positive. For  s = h  we find that the expression [   ] has the same 
value,  e 
-h > 0. 
 
  6    Though for very large values of w the value of x(w) becomes negative, yet, within the range [0,1] 
of  w,  x(w ) > 0 . 
























For  w=0   this expression becomes 
 
(34)   ( h / (s+h))( 1- e 
-(s+h) ) > 0 
 
For  w=1, expression (33) becomes 
 
(35)   ( h / (s-h))( e 
-s  e 
–h ) 
 
     Using an argument similar to that one used to prove the positivity of  (26) we can prove that 
expression (35) is negative. 
 
     Since the derivative of the expression in brackets in eq. (30) is positive for  w=0  and negative 
for  w=1,  it follows that the expression in brackets, and hence  x(w)  itself, has a positive maximum 
somewhere between  w=0 and  w=1.  
 
     Since x(w) is the contribution of an individual of wealth  w  to the felicity of all the individuals 
we can say that in a society where wealth is distributed according to eq. (23) and in which altruistic 
behaviour of any two individuals toward each other decreases with their wealth-distance according 
to eq. (24), the largest contribution to the felicity of other individuals is made by individuals whose 
wealth is neither too high nor too low  (middleclass).                           
 
 
6. Some more remarks can be made considering equation (30). If   h→ ∞ the function  r(w, z)→ 0. 
This means that very large values of  h correspond to a very small concern of an individual about 
others (egoistic behaviour). As  h  increases, eq. (30) tends to  a/2d, which is its smallest value. 
Altruistic behaviour increases      x (w). 
 
     Let us consider now the value of  s. As  s→ ∞, the relative number of individuals with low 
wealth increases. A large value of  s  means a small privileged class of wealthy people. With 
increasing  s,   x (w) decreases and tends to   a/2d. 
 
     For  values  of      h=0,  when each individual is interested equally in the felicity of all the 
individuals,  x(w)  has the value 
(36)   ( a / 2d ) ( 1 + cN ) 
 
which is independent of the wealth and its distribution. If  h > 0   but    s = 0, i.e. when there is the 
same number of individuals in each wealth bracket, then 
 




In this case the derivative of the expression [ • ] in brackets of (37) is 
 
(38)   h [ e 
-hw- e 
-h(1-w)] 
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which is equal to zero for  w=1/2. Hence in this case the maximum contribution to the felicity of the 
whole society is given by individuals with  w=1/2. 
 
 
7. It is important to note that in the transition from eq. (16) to eq. (19) we assumed that the 
coefficients, ai and  di are functions of the wealth only; that the coefficients  rij  are functions of the 
difference in wealth only and that those are the same functions for all individuals. 
    Coefficients  ai  and  di  may not however depend on wealth but rather on some individuals’ 
innate biological characteristics distributed in an economy. They may also depend on the 
occupations that can be different within the same wealth bracket. 
 
     Within these limitations we can speculate that, in general, the concern of an individual with the  
felicity of another  - the degree of altruism -depends on the social distance as well as on the 
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